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GLOBALIZATION AND ECONOMIC 
REGULATION IN CHINA: SELECTIVE 
ADAPTATION OF GLOBALIZED NORMS  
AND PRACTICES1 
PITMAN B. POTTER∗ 
Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Communist Party of China (CPC) 
Central Committee in late 1978, China has pursued a policy of expanded 
participation in the world political economy. This has been reaffirmed most 
recently with China’s accession to the WTO. This process has resulted in 
increased interaction between regulatory norms and practices long-accepted 
as integral features of People’s Republic of China (PRC) rule, and foreign 
norms often associated with globalization that embody significantly different 
assumptions and expectations. The recent record of China’s “open door” 
policy has included ongoing tensions between local and international norms 
and practices of economic regulation. The extent to which globalized norms 
of economic regulation can influence practices in China will depend on the 
dynamic of selective adaptation. Selective adaptation describes a process by 
which foreign ideas are received and assimilated into local conditions.2 This 
paper will examine changing norms and practices of economic regulation in 
China by reference to the dynamic of selective adaptation of norms of 
globalization. 
I. SELECTIVE ADAPTATION 
In the context of a globalizing world in which proponents of liberal norms 
of institutional behavior are particularly powerful, Asia-Pacific states and 
 
 
 1. This Article is based on a paper presented to the conference on Globalization and China’s 
Reforms, held at Fudan University, Shanghai (May 21-24, 2002). Some portions are adapted from 
PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE 
(2001). 
 ∗  Pitman B. Potter is Professor of Law at the Law Faculty of the University of British 
Columbia. He is also Director of U.B.C.’s Institute of Asian Research. His most recent book is FROM 
LENINIST DISCIPLINE TO SOCIALIST LEGALISM: PENG ZHEN ON LAW AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN 
THE PRC (forthcoming 2003). 
 2. See generally PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND 
LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE (2001). Cf. David Kennedy, Receiving the International, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 
1 (1994) (for discussion of various concerns about internationalization). 
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societies engage in selective adaptation as a coping strategy for balancing 
local regulatory imperatives with requirements of compliance with foreign 
norms largely derived from the regimes of liberal democratic capitalism. 
Whether in the realm of compliance with International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
funding requirements,3 U.S. nuclear security mandates,4 or U.N. human 
rights requirements,5 local governments attempt to preserve their policy 
priorities even while acceding, where necessary, to foreign regulatory norms 
(generally expressed through rules, structures, processes, and practices).6 
This involves a complex process of selectively adapting foreign norms to 
local needs. In contrast to ideologies of convergence, suggesting 
development toward a unified system of institutional practices,7 selective 
adaptation is a useful perspective for examining interplay of difference and 
conformity in the interaction between the global and the local.  
Whereas the element of adaptation depends largely on power relations 
that dictate what of the foreign must be borrowed and what of the local may 
be retained, the element of selectivity includes elements of perception, 
complementarity, and legitimacy. Perception determines understanding (and 
misunderstanding) about foreign and local regulatory norms and their origins 
and implications.8 Thus, perceptions about the purpose, content, and effect of 
foreign and local regulatory norms may determine the focus and parameters 
for selection and adaptation. Complementarity describes a circumstance by 
which apparently contradictory priorities are combined for new effect, while 
still preserving essential characteristics of each component.9 In the context of 
economic regulation, the effectiveness of selective adaptation may depend on 
the capacity to combine local and foreign regulatory norms in ways that 
 
 
 3. See generally Timothy Lane & Steven Phillips, Moral Hazard: Does IMF Financing 
Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenders, 28 ECON. ISSUES (Mar. 2002), at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues28/index.htm. 
 4. See generally Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea, in STRATEGIC ASIA: POWER AND PURPOSE 2001-
2002 129-72 (Richard J. Ellings & Aaron L. Friedberg eds., 2002). 
 5. See generally ANNE KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS 
OF COMPLIANCE (1999). 
 6. For discussion of social norms, see generally, Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, 
Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 157 (2000). As regulatory agencies and communities 
constitute types of societies, approaches to social norms would seem appropriate for examining 
regulatory norms. 
 7. See UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997) (see especially ch. 5 and p. 
126). 
 8. ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); see also Etzioni, supra note 6. 
 9. This approach to complementarity owes a significant debt to the work of nuclear physicist 
Niels Bohr. See NIELS H.D. BOHR, ESSAYS, 1958-1962, ON ATOMIC PHYSICS AND HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE (1963); RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB 13 (1986). In the 
context of cross-cultural and social sciences, see Ofira Seliktar, Identifying a Society’s Belief System, 
in POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY (Margaret Herman ed., 1986). 
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address globally derived challenges while remaining true to established local 
values. Legitimacy reflects the extent to which members of local 
communities support the purposes and consequences of selective 
adaptation.10 While the forms and requirements of legitimacy may vary with 
time, space, and context, the effectiveness of selectively adapted regulatory 
norms depends to an important degree on legitimacy of the content and 
process of selection. 
The dynamic of selective adaptation is particularly useful as a perspective 
from which to examine the Chinese government’s efforts to reconcile global 
norms with local imperatives in the field of economic regulation. Selective 
adaptation offers insights to the process by which China has attempted to join 
on its own terms the international political economy, so as to balance 
international norms of economic regulation with local concerns over social 
welfare and balanced development. While unable for political and economic 
reasons to reject openly the norms, institutions, and processes of 
globalization, many Chinese government leaders and policy makers remain 
apprehensive about the socio-economic costs of close interconnection with 
the global market.11 Yet China’s relative size and importance allow it some 
capacity to limit the imposition of foreign regulatory norms. Selective 
adaptation allows compliance with international norms to remain 
contextualized to local conditions and the pursuit of closely-held domestic 
imperatives. 
II. GLOBALIZATION AND NORMS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION—THE 
CHALLENGE OF TRANSPARENCY AND TRADE ADMINISTRATION 
Globalization has been used generally to describe a historical 
phenomenon of cultural and institutional change.12 In the context of 
economic regulation, globalization is associated with the spread of regulatory 
norms of transparency and the rule of law.13 Globalization of law-based 
 
 
 10. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. 1978); 
STEPHEN P. TURNER & REGIS A. FACTOR, MAX WEBER: THE LAWYER AS SOCIAL THINKER (1994); 
RICHARD W. WILSON, COMPLIANCE IDEOLOGIES: RETHINKING POLITICAL CULTURE (1992); Nikolas 
Rose, Governing Liberty, in GOVERNING MODERN SOCIETIES 141 (Richard V. Ericson & Nico Stehr 
eds., 2000); F. Scharpf, Legitimation and Democratic Legitimation, in DISAFFECTED DEMOCRACIES: 
WHAT’S TROUBLING THE TRILATERAL COUNTRIES, (Susan J. Pharr & Robert D. Putman eds., 2000). 
 11. See POTTER, supra note 1, at 125. 
 12. See generally THE CULTURES OF GLOBALIZATION (Fedric Jameson & Masao Miyoshi eds., 
1998); THE GLOBALIZATION READER (F.J. Lechner & J. Boli eds., 2000); FARHANG RAJAEE, 
GLOBALIZATION ON TRIAL: THE HUMAN CONDITION AND THE INFORMATION CIVILIZATION (2000); 
JOHN TOMLINSON, GLOBALIZATION AND CULTURE (1999). 
 13. See generally THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 1960-1995 (Katharina Pistor & Philip A. Wellons eds., 1999); LAW, CAPITALISM AND 
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regulatory systems associated with the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been proposed 
as an antidote to “crony capitalism” and other perceived ills in the economies 
of East and Southeast Asia.14  
As applied to economic regulation, norms of globalization give particular 
weight to issues of transparency and the rule of law. Article X(1) of the 
GATT requires publication of trade regulations, while Article X(2) requires 
publication of general measures affecting an advance in import duties, 
restrictions, or payments before enforcement.15 In addition to imposing state 
obligations to disseminate the content of rules, these provisions may also 
permit the subjects of regulation opportunities to consult with government 
authorities to learn about laws and practices.16 Article X(3) requires states to 
administer trade laws and regulations in a uniform, impartial, and reasonable 
manner, and to establish independent judicial, arbitral, or administrative 
tribunals or procedures for prompt review and correction of administrative 
action that fails to conform to these criteria. The transparency and 
enforcement provisions of the GATT Article X provide the framework for 
implementing the substantive norms of the WTO. For in the absence of 
transparency about the content and application of trade regulations, trading 
partners and their business constitutencies cannot know whether or not the 
central the GATT principles of trade liberalization are being granted or 
denied. The substantive and operational norms complement each other and 
set the tone for the GATT’s regulatory culture. 
The lengthy process of China’s accession to the WTO revealed the extent 
of concern among WTO members that regulatory norms and practices in 
China were inconsistent with the GATT/WTO requirements. The WTO 
Working Party’s Final Report on the Accession of China, tabled at the Fourth 
Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Dohal November 2001 
revealed the extent of this concern.17 Building on a record of work running 
 
 
POWER IN ASIA (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999); ANTHONY WOODIWISS, GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND LABOUR LAW IN PACIFIC ASIA (1998); DONALD BARRY & RONALD C. KEITH, 
REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL TRADE (1999). 
 14. See generally THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 
(G.W. Noble & J. Ravenhill eds., 2000); TOWARDS RECOVERY IN PACIFIC ASIA (George Segal & 
David S.G. Goodman eds., 2000). For discussion of the applicability of liberal models of financial 
regulation to developing economies, see STEPHAN HAGGARD & CHUNG H. LEE, FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1995) and THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Stephen Haggard et al. eds., 1993). 
 15. For text see THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS 424 (World Trade Organization ed., 1999). 
 16. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 463 (1969). 
 17. World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, Report of the Working Party on the 
Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, Nov. 10, 2001, available at http://www.wto.org/english/the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss1/5
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from March 4, 1987, when the Working Party was established, through the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995, and culminating in its 2001 Final Report, 
the Working Party attempted to identify, understand, and resolve numerous 
apparent conflicts and inconsistencies between Chinese trade policy and 
regulatory practice and the GATT/WTO standards.18 
Building on a draft protocol completed in 1997, the final Protocol on the 
Accession of the People’s Republic of China19 confirmed the PRC’s 
commitment to abide by the GATT/WTO standards on such matters as 
national treatment, non-discrimination, transparency, and uniform 
administration. In the area of transparency in particular, China committed 
itself to make available to WTO members, on request, all laws, regulations, 
and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-
related intellectual property, or the control of foreign exchange before such 
measures are implemented or enforced. The Protocol also provided that only 
those laws, regulations, and other measures that are published and readily 
available to other WTO members, individuals, and enterprises shall be 
enforced. A limited emergency exception was granted permitting China to 
make such measures available at the latest when they are enforced or 
implemented. The Protocol also required China to establish an official 
journal dedicated to the publication of all laws, regulations, and other 
measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, services, trade-related 
intellectual property or the control of foreign exchange. The WTO also 
required the government to provide a reasonable period for comment to the 
appropriate authorities before such measures are implemented. Limited 
exceptions were granted for national security, specific exchange rates and 
monetary policy, and situations when publication would impede 
enforcement.  
The final Protocol also required China to apply and administer in a 
uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner its laws, regulations, and other 
measures of the central government; as well as local regulations, rules, and 
other measures issued or applied at the sub-national level pertaining to or 
affecting trade in goods, services, trade related aspects of intellectual 
property rights, and foreign exchange. China’s local regulations, rules, and 
other measures must conform to China’s obligations undertaken in the final 
Protocol of Accession. The Protocol required that China establish a 
 
 
wto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm. 
 18. See generally Richard Elgin, Challenges and Implications of China Joining the WTO (June 
19, 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author). 
 19. World Trade Organization, Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, Nov, 
23, 2001, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/completeacc_e.htm. 
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mechanism under which individuals and enterprises can bring complaints of 
non-uniform application of the trade regime to the attention of the national 
authorities.  
While China’s accession to the WTO is often portrayed as a matter of 
economics and commerce, it is at root a fundamental challenge of politics 
and governance. The GATT/WTO principles of transparency derive broadly 
from liberal principles of government accountability. Proceeding from tenets 
about human equality and natural law, the liberal tradition of political 
ideology asserts that government is essentially an agency of popular will.20 
Such agency requires accountability from political leaders through 
democratic elections, and from administrative agencies through norms of 
transparency and the rule of law. Responsible agency is thus a typology by 
which regulators and their political superiors are accountable to the subjects 
of regulation, and as a result are expected to exercise regulatory authority 
broadly in accordance with norms of transparency and the rule of law. The 
accountability of political and administrative agents may be described in 
terms of their responsibility to society. 
Norms of responsible agency associated with globalization constitute a 
belief system driven by changing historical conditions of socio-economic and 
political relations in Europe and North America. The capacity of the liberal 
industrial economies to promote their preferred regulatory norms as an 
essential element of globalization derives as much from political and 
economic power as from the inherent wisdom of the ideas themselves.21 The 
essentially one-way direction by which these norms are disseminated around 
the world reflects imbalances in political and economic power between 
developed and developing economies, that characterize the current dynamic 
of globalization. In the case of China, however, the effects of globalized 
regulatory norms are confronted by powerful forces of local culture. 
The norms that inform China’s regulatory culture may be described in 
terms of patrimonial sovereignty. Drawing on traditional norms of Confucian 
patrimonialism combined with ideals of revolutionary leadership associated 
with Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, regulatory culture in China tends to 
emphasize a dynamic by which governance is pursued by a sovereign 
 
 
 20. See generally ROGER COTTERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 112 (1989); Agnes Heller, On Formal Democracy, in CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND THE STATE: NEW EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 129 (John Keane ed., 1988). For 
comparative context, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 126 (1977). 
 21. R. Harrison Wagner, Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power and Political Influence, 
42 INT’L ORG. 461 (1988). 
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political authority that remains largely immune to challenge.22 During the 
first thirty years of Communist rule, regulatory norms served nearly 
exclusively as instruments of the Party-state’s policies of control. Notions of 
accountability were marginalized. By the turn of the century, even after 
twenty years of legal reform, the supremacy for the Party-state remains a 
salient feature in the regulatory process. Whether the policy aim is military 
re-strengthening, economic growth, or social welfare, accountability remains 
tied to results rather than process, and in the end is enforced primarily 
through government campaign rather than societal initiative. Patrimonial 
sovereignty is thus a typology by which regulators are accountable only to 
their bureaucratic and political superiors, and as a result have few obligations 
to heed the subjects of rule in the process or substance of regulation. Under 
the dynamic of patrimonial sovereignty, political leaders and administrative 
agencies have responsibility for society but are not responsible to it. 
These competing visions of regulatory culture inform China’s efforts to 
comply with the transparency and rule of law requirements of the GATT and 
the WTO. The government has begun a wide-ranging campaign to revise 
existing legislation and administrative regulations in most economic sectors, 
including customs, foreign exchange, taxation, intellectual property, 
enterprise law, bankruptcy, pricing, and other areas.23 Whether these reforms 
will match the expectations of WTO members and their respective business 
communities remains to be seen. Nonetheless, in the context of tensions 
between regulatory cultures of patrimonial sovereignty and responsible 
agency, China’s regulatory reform project may usefully be examined by 
reference to the dynamic of selective adaptation.  
III. CHANGING NORMS AND PRACTICES OF 
 ECONOMIC REGULATION IN CHINA  
The effects of globalization on norms and practices of economic 
regulation in China may be identified by reference to issues of property 
reform, administrative law reform, and corporate governance, where 
conditions of perception, complementarity, and legitimacy affect the 
 
 
 22. See generally KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA (1995); KENNETH LIEBERTHAL & 
MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY-MAKING IN CHINA: LEADERS STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES (1988); 
INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, PROGRESS IN 
CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS CAUSE, at http://www.chinaguide.org/e-white/index.htm (Apr. 9, 2001); 
CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (W. Theodore de Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998). On regulatory 
and legal norms, see Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Continuing Commitment to the 
Primacy of State Power,” 159 CHINA Q. 673 (1999). 
 23. See Potter, supra note 1. 
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dynamic of selective adaptation. In property law, the predominance of public 
property regimes reflects a legacy of Marxism-Leninism, and embodies 
perceptions about public interest and governmental responsibility. Reforms 
in China’s property system reflect efforts to find complementarity between 
the legacy of public property and the private property ideals that dominate 
the international system. In light of the Chinese regime’s claim to an 
ideological mantel of socialism, property reform also poses a significant 
question of legitimacy.  
Administrative law reform reflects more directly the tensions between 
patrimonial sovereignty to responsible agency in norms of regulation. 
Notions of judicial review of administrative action, administrative 
supervision, and compensation for administrative errors, reflect increased 
attention to accountability, but also suggest efforts by the government to 
control lower level administrators. Despite possible conflicts of purpose, 
administrative law reform offers an important glimpse into the Chinese 
government’s efforts to manage the process of reform. 
Corporate governance reflects the influences of reforms in China’s private 
property and administrative law regimes. In the context of state-owned 
enterprises particularly, reform embodies issues of perception regarding the 
relative social utility of public and private property interests in business 
entities, as well as issues of complementarity and legitimacy between public 
and private ownership. Regulation of corporate governance also reflects 
issues of perception regarding national interest, development, and 
dependence; issues of complementarity between pre-existing regulatory 
priorities of protectionism and local development and WTO-mandated norms 
of national treatment; and issues of legitimacy in the content and outcomes of 
WTO compliance. 
A. Property 
Property rights in China are influenced by a legal culture that, broadly 
speaking, emphasizes collective and state interests over individual identity. In 
traditional China, economic activity was built generally on collective 
relationships of patronage and clan, rather than individual ownership.24 More 
recently, the socialist ideology of Maoism repudiated explicitly the notion of 
private property rights and installed the Party-state as the guardian of public 
 
 
 24. See, e.g., Tu Weiming, A Confucian Perspective on the Rise of Industrial East Asia, in 
CONFUCIANISM AND THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA (Silke Kreigher & Rolf Trausettel eds., 1991). 
See also HILL GATES, CHINA’S MOTOR: A THOUSAND YEARS OF PETTY CAPITALISM (1996) (see 
chapter 2 for a discussion of “the Tributary and Petty-Capitalist Mode of Production.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol2/iss1/5
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welfare.25 The early post-Mao period saw a gradual introduction of imported 
notions of private autonomy in the acquisition and management of property, 
but subject always to the overarching political imperative of collective and 
public interests.26 
The recent development of property rights discourse bears the imprint of 
the Western liberal tradition.27 Indeed, under the rubric of property rights 
internationalization, Chinese jurists have called for greater reference to 
foreign law from Japan and Europe, and Anglo-North American tradition as 
precedents for property rights reforms in China.28 Chinese civil law notions 
of property behavior (wuquan xingwei) have been influenced in particular by 
German law (either directly or in the forms adopted in Japan and Taiwan).29 
Taiwanese law scholars such as Wang Zejian, have been particularly 
influential in the transmission of German civil law concepts to China.30 
However, in the absence of relatively autonomous norms and effective 
institutions to restrain state action, China’s adoption of the liberal private 
property rights regime remains incomplete. 
 
 
 25. See, e.g., R. BIN WONG, CHINA TRANSFORMED: HISTORICAL CHANGE AND THE LIMITS OF 
EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE (1997) (see chapter 8 for a discussion of the changes in Chinese states after 
1949). 
 26. See generally Qian Mingxing, Woguo Minshi Fazhi Sishi Nian de Bianqian [Changes in 
Forty Years of Our Civil Law System], ZHONGWAI FAXUE [CHINESE AND FOREIGN LAW], no. 5, 1 
(1989). 
 27. See generally PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA (Jean C. Oi & Andrew 
G. Walder eds., 1999).  
 28. See, e.g., Qian Mingxing, Lun Woguo Wuquanfa de Jiben Yuance [On the Basic Principles of 
Our Civil Law], BEIJING DAXUE XUEBAO [PEKING U. J.], no. 1, 29 (1998); Zheng Chengsi, Minfadian 
Zhong de Jige Gainian Xianyi [Various Basic Ideas in the Civil Code], MINSHANG FAXUE [CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL LAW], no. 7, 14 (1998); Yu Nengwu & Wang Shenyi, Lun Wuquan Fa de Xiandaihua 
Fazhan Qushi [The Development of Modern Property Law], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE 
JURISPRUDENCE], no. 1, 72 (1998); Zheng Ruikun, Lun Woguo de Wuquan Lifa [Legislation of Our 
Country’s Property Rights], FAXUE [JURISPRUDENCE], no. 3, 16, 18-19 (1998); Guo Mingrui, Guanyu 
Woguo Wuquan Lifa de San Dian Sikao [Three Perspectives on Our Country’s Property Legislation], 
ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE], no. 2, 21 (1998). 
 29. See, e.g, LIANG HUIXING, ZHONGGUO WUQUANFA CAOAN JIANYI GAO [OUTLINE OF 
OPINION ON A DRAFT CHINESE PROPERTY LAW] (2000); Sun Xianzhi, Wuquan Xingwei Lilun Tan 
Yuan Yiqi Yiyi [Exploring the Origins and Significance of Theories of Property Behavior], FAXUE 
YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 3, 80 (1996); Wang Liming, Wuquan Xingwei Ruogan Wenti Tantao 
[Inquiry on Several Issues of Property Rights Behavior], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE 
JURISPRUDENCE], no. 1, 58 (1997). See also Edward J. Epstein, The Theoretical System of Property 
Rights in China’s General Principles of Civil Law: Theoretical Controversy In the Drafting Process 
and Beyond, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (Spring 1989). 
 30. See, e.g., Qian Mingxing, WUQUANFA DE YUANZE [PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW] (1994); 
Ji Yibao, Lun Wuquan Gongshi de Xingzhi he Zhidu Jiazhi [On the Character and Systemic Value of 
Property Public Notice] ZHONG WAI FAXUE [CHINESE AND FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE], no. 3, 47 
(1997). See also Wang Liming, supra note 29. 
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1. Property Relations and Economic Reform 
The economic reform policies begun in 1978 raised the prospect of 
greater managerial autonomy in state-owned enterprises and increased 
diversity of economic actors and transactions.31 However, during the post-
Mao period of economic reform, the state remained a key player in property 
relations—state property rights remained dominant albeit purportedly in the 
service of social interests.32 The 1982 Constitution extended protection to 
property, but only to the extent that it is “lawful property,” the definition of 
which remains the exclusive province of the state.33 Constitutional 
requirements that the exercise of citizens’ rights, including the right to own 
property, must not conflict with state or social interest effectively grant the 
state a monopoly on interpreting that interest and on determining the extent 
to which private property rights that might possibly conflict with it will be 
recognized and enforced.34  
The General Principles of Civil Law (GPCL) (1986) codified broad 
principles of property rights, albeit subject to provisions that these not 
conflict with state policies and public and social interests.35 The GPCL 
reflected CPC policies that, while attempting to limit the intrusion of the state 
into social and economic relationships, still assert basic principles of state 
control. Thus, the GPCL emphasized notions of party equality; voluntariness; 
and the protection of citizens’ lawful rights and interests (thus diminishing 
the arbitrary authority of state organs and officials to intrude upon civil law 
relations in property), but also recognized the fundamental principle of 
socialist legal order and the still-central role of state planning.36  
Despite the changes brought on by economic reform, and despite the 
formal equality among legal actors provided by civil law,37 the State’s 
 
 
 31. See generally He Guanghui, Continue to Deepen Reform by Centering on Economic 
Improvement and Rectification, ZHONGGUO JINGJI TIZHI GAIGE [REFORM OF THE CHINESE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE], 1990, no. 2, in FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA, Mar. 23, 1990, at 21. 
 32. See Wang Liming, Guojia Suoyouquan de Falu Tezheng Yanjiu [Research on the Legal 
Features of State Property Rights], FALU KEXUE [LEGAL SCIENCE], no. 6, 29 (1990); Jiang Shan, 
Shilun Wuquan He Woguo de Wuquan Zhidu Tixi [Tentative Theory on Property Rights and Our 
Country’s Property Rights System], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 5, 70 (1988). 
 33. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa, [Constitution of the People’s Republic of China], art. 13 
(1982) [hereinafter XIANFA]. 
 34. XIANFA, art. 51 (1982). 
 35. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [General Principles of Civil Law of the 
People’s Republic of China], art. 6 (1986) [hereinafter General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC].  
 36. See, e.g., Liang Huixing, Wo Guo Min Fa de Jiben Yuanze [Basic Principles of Our Civil 
Law], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE], no. 3, 3 (1987). 
 37. See, e.g., Meng Qinguo, Jingji Tizhi Gaige Shiqi de Minshi Lifa [Civil Legislation in the 
Time of Economic Structural Reform], ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE [CHINESE SOCIAL SCIENCES], no. 6, 
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responsibility to harmonize different economic and social interests remained. 
Judicial decisions in property cases during the mid-1980s, relied heavily on 
interpretations of the GPCL (1986) that enshrined the centrality of state 
interests.38 Decisions on such matters as unjust enrichment (budang deli) 
cited with favor GPCL provisions emphasizing the importance of state and 
collective property.39 The policy implications about the diminution of class 
struggle, stemming from the Thirteenth CPC Congress (October 1987) 
consensus on China in the early stage of socialism, supported broader social 
and economic autonomy and stronger protection for civil-law based property 
rights.40 As the exploitative possibilities of property relations received less 
concern, limited efforts were made to recognize subsequently rights of 
privately operated enterprises41 and individuals.42  
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, law and regulation on property 
matters focused mainly on state-owned property and the extent of autonomy 
granted to managers of (generally state-owned) enterprises. The GPCL 
recognized the rights of enterprise managers to administer enterprise 
property.43 These provisions were expanded in the Law on Industrial 
Enterprises Owned by the Whole People (1988), otherwise referred to as the 
“State-Owned Enterprise Law.”44 The rights of enterprise managers were 
grounded in the policies of the socialist commodity economy and the rights 
 
 
77 (1988). 
 38. See Yang Lixin, RENMIN FAYUAN ANLI LEIBIAN PINGXI: MINSHI SHENPAN ZHUAN 
[CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TYPES OF PEOPLE’S COURT CASES: VOLUME ON CIVIL JUDGMENTS] 19, 168 
(1998). 
 39. See CHUI XIUMING ET AL., RENMIN FAYUAN YINAN PANLI PINGXI: MINSHI ZHUAN 
[CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DIFFICULT DECISIONS BY THE PEOPLE’S COURTS; CIVIL VOLUME] 45 (1999). 
 40. See Zhao Ziyang, Advance Along the Road to Socialism With Chinese Characteristics, in 
DOCUMENTS OF THE THIRTEENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA 39 
(1987). For discussion of the implications for civil law, see Yang Chenshan, SHEHUI ZHUYI CHU 
JIEDUAN LILUN YU WO GUO DE MINFA XUE [THE THEORY OF THE PRIMARY STAGE OF SOCIALISM 
AND THE STUDY OF OUR CIVIL LAW], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE], no. 5, 3 (1988). 
 41. See Shi Zhuhua, Siying Qiye Lifa de Lilun Yiju he Jiben Yuanze [Theoretical Basis and Basic 
Principles of Private Enterprise Law], ZHENGZHI YU FALU [POLITICS AND LAW], no. 4, 35 (1998); Li 
Peizhuan, Tan Woguo Siying Qiye Lifa Wenti [On Issues of Our Private Enterprise Legislation], 
ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE], no. 4, 11 (1988); Xie Shisong, Lun Geti Jingji de Falu 
Wenti [On Legal Issues of the Individual Economy], ZHENGZHI YU FALU [POLITICS AND LAW], no. 2, 
28 (1988). 
 42. See Zhong Wenbin, Woguo Gongmin Geren Suoyouquan de Xingzhi [Characteristics of Our 
Citizens’ Individual Property Rights], XIANDAI FAXUE [MODERN LAW], no. 5, 46 (1989). 
 43. General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC, supra note 35, art. 82. 
 44. See ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO QUANMIN SUOYOUZHI GONGYE QIYE FA ZHISHI 
SHOUCE [HANDBOOK OF KNOWLEDGE ON THE LAW OF THE PRC ON INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES 
OWNED BY THE WHOLE PEOPLE] (Mu Xichuan & Zhang Lingyuan eds., 1988). For text and 
commentary, see ZEN YANG ZHENGQUE SHISHI QIYE FA [HOW TO PRECISELY IMPLEMENT THE 
ENTERPRISE LAW] (China Economic Law Research Association, Beijing Branch and Beijing 
Municipal Government Electronic Industries Office ed., 1988). 
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of persons in possession of property (zhanyouquan).45 By distinguishing 
ownership from rights to managerial autonomy, reform policies attempted to 
stimulate enterprise performance without compromising orthodox views on 
public ownership.46 Regulations issued in 1988 covered private enterprises 
including individually operated businesses.47 However, the “provisional” 
nature of the regulations, and explicit provisions subordinating the private 
economy to the socialist publicly owned economy underscored that private 
enterprises were still viewed as policy concessions to the needs of economic 
growth and subject to the will and the dispensation of the state. Despite 
continued challenges to conventional limits on private property rights, further 
constitutional protection was not forthcoming.48 
During the period of accelerated reform following Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 
Southern Tour, property policy and legislation emerged as an important 
agenda item for both academics and government officials. While 
conventional norms of public ownership and protection of public interest 
remained well represented,49 increased attention was paid to reforming the 
system of state ownership. Existing discourses on management rights 
expanded to address not only issues of managerial autonomy, but also 
 
 
 45. See Wang Liming, Lun Shangpin Suoyouquan [On Commodity Ownership Rights], FAXUE 
YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 2, 37 (1986); Wang Liming, Suoyouquan Minfa Baohu de Ruogan 
Wenti [Various Issues of Civil Law Protection of Property Rights], FAXUE XUEXI YU YANJIU [STUDY 
AND RESEARCH IN JURISPRUDENCE], no. 4, 57 (1988).  
 46. See Zhang Ling, Jingyingquan Chansheng Genju Xin Tan [New Inquiry on the Progeny of 
Managerial Rights], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 6, 47 (1998); Ding Jimin, Jingyingquan yu 
Suoyouquan [Managerial Rights and Ownership Rights], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 1, 12 
(1987); Li Yongfu, Suoyouquan yu Jingyingquan Fenli Wenti de Bijiaofa Sikao [Comparative Law 
Perspectives on the Issue of Separating Ownership from Management Rights], BEIJING SHEHUI KEXUE 
[BEIJING SOCIAL SCIENCES], no. 1, 153 (1989); Guo Shaodong, Guanyu Shehui Zhuyi Quanmin 
Suoyouquan de Xingzhi, Tezheng he Shixian Wenti [On the Issues of Character, Features and 
Implementation of Socialist Public Ownership Rights] FAXUE LUNCONG [COLLECTED THEORIES ON 
LEGAL STUDIES], no. 2, 46 (1989); Wang Chong & Jiang Deyuan, Lun Guojia Suoyouquan, 
Xingzhengquan yu Qiye Jingyingquan de Fenli [On the Separation of State Ownership and 
Administrative Rights From Enterprise Management Rights], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 2, 
47 (1988). 
 47. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Siying Qiye Zanxing Guiding [Provisional Regulations of 
the PRC on Privately Managed Enterprises], in SIYING QIYE CHANGYONG FALU SHOUCE [HANDBOOK 
OF COMMONLY USED LAWS ON PRIVATE ENTERPRISES] 1 (Law and Regulation Editorial Office of 
Law Publishing House ed., 1988). 
 48. The Chinese Communist Party’s authoritative journal Quishi [Seeking Truth], specifically 
repudiated suggestions that the Constitution be revised yet again to accommodate expanded private 
property rights ideals. See Xiao Weiyun, Woguo Xianfa Ji Qi Guiding de Guojia Genben Zhidu Bu 
Rong Fouding [The Basic System of the State as Set Forth in the Constitution and its Provisions is not 
Easy to Deny], QIUSHI [SEEKING TRUTH], no. 22, 25 (1990). 
 49. See, e.g., Li Yunhe, Dui Gongyouzhi We Zhuti de Yi Dian Kanfa [A View on the Centrality of 
Public Ownership], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE], no. 5, 37 (1993); Wang Shenyi, 
Lun Wuquan de Shehuihua [On the Socialization of Property Rights], FAXUE PINGLUN [LEGAL 
STUDIES COMMENTARY], no. 1, 56 (1999). 
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managerial responsibility to conserve state property.50 Problems of 
corruption and mismanagement of state property (particularly in state-owned 
enterprises) gave rise to calls for tighter regulation.51 However, policy 
changes supporting the transition to a market economy meant that state 
ownership rights must also evolve and in some instances give way to diverse 
alternatives.52  
The PRC Constitution was amended in 1993 to affirm the socialist market 
economy as the foundation for economic policy.53 The transition from the 
socialist commodity economy meant that increased market autonomy for 
economic actors (including individuals as well as enterprises) could extend 
beyond the realm of commodities, supported by a property rights regime that 
could extend beyond personal property and immovable property, such as 
land and movables, to include intangibles such as intellectual property.54 In 
1995, a semi-official proposal on property legislation was published, which 
suggested that conventional boundaries for property rights as set forth in the 
GPCL should be re-examined.55  
A key issue has been whether property rights are abstract (wuyinxing) or 
the result of causation (i.e. transactional—youyinxing). Influenced by 
principles of German law (drawn from the Roman law tradition), proponents 
of inherency argue that rights in property transcend the transactions by which 
they are transferred.56 The implications of inherency suggest a diminution of 
the State’s authority to control the content and scope of property rights, as the 
 
 
 50. See, e.g., Xie Zichang & Wang Xiujing, Guanyu Chanquan de Ruogan Lilun Wenti [Several 
Theoretical Questions about Property Rights], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 1, 42 (1994). 
 51. See, e.g., Forum Comments in Jiaqiang Guoyou Zichan Guanli Duse Guoyou Zichan Liushi 
Luodong [Strengthen Management of State Property and Block the Runoff and Leakage of State 
Property], ZHENGZHI YU FALU [LAW AND POLITICS], no. 1, 22, 22-24, 45 (1996); Wang Jueyu, Ezhi 
Guoyou Zichan Liushi de Falu Duixiang, [Legal Objectives of Halting the Losses of State Owned 
Property], FAXUE [JURISPRUDENCE], no. 6, 35 (1995). 
 52. See, e.g., Zou Xi & Shu Sheng, Shichang Jingji Shehui Zhong de Guojia Caichan 
Suoyouquan [State Property Ownership Rights in the Market Economy Society], ZHONGGUO FAXUE 
[CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE], no. 4, 56 (1996). 
 53. See Draft Amendments to Constitution Discussed, XINHUA ENG. SERV., Mar. 22, 1993, in 
FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA (FBIS-CHI-93-054), Mar. 23, 1993, at 13. 
 54. See Gong Xiangrui & Jiang Mingan, Zai Lun Gongmin Caichanquan de Xianfa Baohu 
[Again, on Constitutional Protection for Citizens’ Property Rights], ZHONGGUO FAXUE, [CHINESE 
JURISPRUDENCE], no. 2, 70 (1992). 
 55. See Property Law Research Program of CASS Law Institute, Zhiding Zhongguo Wuquanfa 
de Jiben Sikao [Basic Perspectives on Enacting Chinese Property Law], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN 
LAW], no. 3, 3 (1995). 
 56. See LIANG HUIXING, ZHONGGUO WUQUANFA CAOAN JIANYI GAO [OUTLINE OF OPINION ON 
A DRAFT CHINESE PROPERTY LAW] 93 (2000). See also Qian, supra 28, at 29-38. As applied to Bills 
of Lading for example, the property rights in the underlying goods remain independent of the 
documention. See Guo Yu, Lun Tidan de Wuquanxing [On the Property Rights Character of Bills of 
Lading], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE], no. 4, 69 (1997).  
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State’s regulatory authority over transactions would not extent to the 
underlying property rights themselves. A contrary approach suggests that 
property rights are transactional, such that the character and scope of 
property rights depend on the terms and conditions of underlying 
transactions.57 Thus, land use rights or ownership rights to buildings and 
improvements may depend on the validity of the agreements through which 
these rights are transferred.58 Under the transactional approach to property 
rights, the State’s power to determine the effectiveness of transactions 
extends as well to the character of the underlying property rights that are the 
subject of those transactions.59 The issue whether civil law rights (including 
property rights) derive from, and thus are dependant upon, transactional 
conditions remained a major issue in the drafting of a civil code in the late 
1990s, reflecting, along with continued debates about the public and private 
character of civil law, the continued difficulty of bringing full autonomy to 
civil law relations under China’s socialist system.60  
2. Limits to Adaptation of Private Property Rights Norms 
Efforts to draft a Code of Property Law in 1998, under the aegis of a Civil 
Code drafting team headed by former CASS Law Institute Director Professor 
Wang Jiafu, suggested continued limits to the discourse of private property 
rights. The property law drafting group led by CASS’s Liang Huixing 
posited the principle that property rights could not be interfered with by third 
parties (including government organs).61 Yet the draft retains the basic 
principles of protecting lawful rights and interests, safeguarding social and 
economic order and socialist modernization, and prohibition against property 
rights that harm the public interest.62 Explanations of this section make 
 
 
 57. See Wang, supra note 29. 
 58. See Wang Yongxia, Lun Budongchan Wuquan Biandong Zhong Zhaiquan he Wuquan de 
Baohu [Safeguarding Creditor and Property Rights in the Transfer of Immovable Property Rights], 
FAXUE PINGLUN [LEGAL STUDIES COMMENTARY], no. 2, 121 (1998). 
 59. For examples of the debate, see Liang Huixing, Wo Guo Minfa Shi Fou Chengren Wuquan 
Xingwei? [Does our Civil Law Recognize Actions in Property?], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], 
no. 6, 59 (1989) (arguing that the transactional requirements bring property rights within the purview 
of obligations, thus diminising their autonomy); Zhang Yumin & Tian Shaomei, Wo Guo Minfa 
Yingdang Chengren Wuquan Xingwei [Our Civil Law Ought to Recognize Actions in Property], 
XIANDAI FAXUE [MODERN LAW], no. 6, 27 (1997) (arguing that property rights are distinct from 
obligations, and should be automonous and protected). 
 60. See, e.g., Jiang Ping, Zhiding Minfadian de Jidian Xiongguan Sikao [Several Macroscopic 
Perspectives on Drafting a Civil Code], ZHENGFA LUNTAN [POLITICS AND LAW FORUM], no. 3, 26 
(1997). 
 61. See Liang, supra note 29, art. 2, at 5. 
 62. Id. arts. 1 & 5. 
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specific reference to the constitutional provisions on the market economy 
and, by extension the limits on marketization imposed by the Party’s policy 
imperatives on socio-economic order.63 Thus, even as renewed efforts are 
made to enshrine property rights into legal codes, the rights that result will 
unavoidably remain subject to the general tenor of the Constitution, which 
currently favors socialist public ownership over private property rights.  
Confronting those who argued for more expansive private property rights 
protections in the Constitution, opponents of expanded constitutional 
protection suggested that this would contribute to problems of corruption and 
misuse of state property.64 This reflected, more fundamentally, the extent to 
which the system of public ownership remains deeply ingrained in the 
normative and institutional framework for China’s property law regime.65 
Indeed, the importance of conforming to China’s particular conditions 
(tedian) remains a powerful orthodoxy governing the scope and terms of 
property rights reform.66 Doctrinal norms continue to emphasize the 
importance of state interests in the enforcement of private law relations.67 
The centrality of public ownership is part of this orthodoxy, and inhibits the 
emergence of private property rights.68 
The 1999 revisions to the Constitution did not ultimately include a 
provision on the sanctity of private property rights. Instead, the language 
provided that the self-employed, private, and other non-public sectors 
constituted an important component of the socialist market economy, whose 
lawful rights and interests would be protected by the state.69 While this was 
 
 
 63. Id. at 95-97. 
 64. See Huang Rutong, Shi Fou Yiding Yao Ba “Siying Caichan Shensheng Bu Ke Qinfan” 
Xiejin Woguo Xianfa? [Do We Definitely Want to Write “the Sanctity of Private Property is 
Inviolable” into our Constitution?], DANGDAI FAXUE [MODERN LAW], no. 4, 5 (1998). 
 65. See Qian Mingxing, Woguo Wuquanfa de Tiaozheng Fanwei, Neirong Tedian Ji Wuquan Tixi 
[The Scope of Adjustment, Special Contents and Property System in Our Property Law], ZHONG WAI 
FAXUE [CHINESE AND FOREIGN JURISPRUDENCE], no. 2, 88 (1997).  
 66. See Guo, supra note 28, at 23-24. 
 67. See, e.g., Yu & Wang, supra note 28, at 73. 
 68. See generally Wen Zhiyang, Zhanlun Zhongguo Minfa Wuquan Tixi [Sketching China’s Civil 
Law Property System] FAXUE [JURISPRUDENCE], no. 6, 37 (1997). For a poignant example of a 
reformist scholar towing the line in times of conservatism, see Wang Liming, Lun Guojia Suoyouquan 
Zhuti de Quanminxing Wenti [On the Issue of the Mass Character of the Bulk of State Ownership 
Rights], ZHONGNAN ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF THE CENTRAL SOUTH POLITICAL 
LEGAL INSTITUTE], no. 4, 17 (1990). 
 69. See Text of PRC Constitutional Amendment, BEIJING XINHUA DOMESTIC SERV., Mar. 16, 
1999, in FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA (FBIS-CHI-1999-0316) (Mar. 17, 1999), at 
http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi?IOI=FBIS_clear&docname=0f8r9qd0340m6g&CID= 
C677307128906250236624568; Tian Jiyun on Constitutional Amendments, BEIJING XINHUA 
DOMESTIC SERV., Mar. 13, 1999, in FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA (FBIS-CHI-1999-0316) (Mar. 19, 
1999), at Li Peng Presides Over Closing of 9th NPC, BEIJING XINHUA DOMESTIC SERV., Mar. 15, 
1999, in FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA (FBIS-CHI-1999-0326) (Mar. 29, 1999), at 
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touted as a major step forward in China’s reform process, the reference to 
state protection of lawful rights and interests signals that the private sector 
will remain subject to significant state contol.70 Parallel provisions can be 
found in the unified Contract Law of the PRC, which confines contracts to 
notions of “lawful rights and interests of the parties” and to the imperative to 
protect “state and social interests.”71 The limits of the constitutional revision 
suggest that China’s socialist system continues to privilege public property, 
and while it might tolerate or even encourage private property, this remains 
dependent on the policy direction and dispensation of the Party–state.72 
Indeed, complaints about the phenomenon of “unit crimes” (danwei zui) such 
as bribery and tax evasion committed by enterprises suggest further limits to 
official tolerance of private businesses.73 The constitutional amendment 
originated with the CPC Central Committee,74 and confirmed that while the 
policy of the socialist market economy would permit individual enterprises 
and private firms to play an important role, ultimately property rights would 
remain subject to the policy priorities of the Party-state and would not 
receive absolute constitutional sanction.  
In the legal and policy discourse of property law, property relations 
remain a creation of the state and are subject to the limitations of positive 
public law enacted by the state.75 Chinese jurists point to foreign precedents, 
such as Japan’s Civil Code, as support for this approach: “The civil laws of 
most modern countries adopt legal positivism (fading zhuyi) over laissez faire 
(fangren zhuyi)” to address property rights.76 Thus, procedural requirements 
that formation of private law relations depend on establishing the requisite 
 
 
http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi?IOI=FBIS_clear&docname=0f8ucq0030tmdy&CID= 
C518371582031250236625998. 
 70. See Constitution Amendment Gives Solid Legal Support to Private Business, CHINA ECON. 
NEWS: SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT FOR THE 2D PLENARY SESSION OF THE 9TH NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, 
Apr. 19, 1999, at 2; Constitutional Amendments Propel China’s Reform and Opening-up, BEIJING 
XINHUA ENGLISH SERV., Mar. 15, 1999, in FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA (FBIS-CHI-1999-0315) (Mar. 
15, 1999), at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi?IOI=FBIS_clear&docname=0f9dnzn03 
ewizs&CID=C518371582031250236625998. 
 71. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa [People’s Republic of China Unified Contract 
Law] arts. 1 & 52 (Mar. 15, 1999), FAGUI HUIBAN (1999, no. 1) at 5, 12 [hereinafter Contract Law of 
the PRC]. 
 72. See Zhang Guangbo, Lun Caichan de Shensheng Bu Ke Ginfan [On the Sanctity of Property 
is Inviolable] FAXUE ZAZHI [LEGAL STUDIES MAGAZINE], no. 4, 10 (1999). 
 73. See, e.g., Dai Jiabing, For Public Interest: Breaking the Law and Not Being Punished, FAZHI 
RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Feb. 23, 1998, at 7.  
 74. See More on NPC Third Plenary Meeting, BEIJING XINHUA ENG. SERV., Mar. 9, 1999, in 
FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA (FBIS-CHI-1999-0308), Mar. 9, 1999. 
 75. See Yu & Wang, supra note 28, at 74; Jonas Alsen, An Introduction to Chinese Property 
Law, 20 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1 (1996). 
 76. See Qian, supra note 28, at 29-38. 
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capacity and authority of the parties, permit state licensing and approval 
agencies to play a central role in determining what kinds of legal rights will 
be recognized.77 
The development of property law in China reflects a dynamic of selective 
adaptation of norms associated with globalization. The fundamental tension 
between public and private property interests embodies a tension between 
collectivist norms of Chinese tradition and PRC socialism, on the one hand, 
and norms espousing the virtues of private property rights tied to liberal 
regulatory regimes supported by globalization. The element of perception is 
evident in the views of official and academic observers, both in their reaction 
to and differing levels of support for private property ideals, and in 
assumptions and assertions about the virtues of public goods in the global 
context. Efforts to reconcile these differing approaches express elements of 
complementarity, as limited private property norms are combined with 
proscriptions against injury to public interest or the interests of the state. How 
effective this effort at complementarity will be remains to be seen. Elements 
of legitimacy are also evident, as official policy efforts to accelerate 
economic growth reflect conclusions that regime legitimacy depends 
significantly on economic success. Factors of legitimacy also are evident in 
efforts to retrain traditional fealty to norms of public interest. The process of 
selective adaptation that has informed China’s property law reforms remains 
dynamic, with its contours subject to changing conditions that affect 
elements of perception, complementarity, and legitimacy.  
B. Administrative Law 
Whereas property law provides substantive norms for regulation of 
economic rights and interests, administrative law provides process norms for 
 
 
 77. See Shourangfang Jieshou Jishu Fuzhu Shishi, Bu Dei Chaoyue Ziji Jing Gong Shang 
Xingzheng Guanli Bumen Hezhun Dengji de Shengchan Jingying Fanwei [The Transferee Receives 
Technical Input, and Should Not Overstep Its Own Registered Scope of Production Management 
Received Through Examination and Ratification By the Industrial and Commercial Administration 
Departments], in JINGJI FA ANLI XUAN XI [COMPILATION AND ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC LAW CASES) 
236 (Dan You ed., 1990), (holding invalid a contract which was deemed to be outside the registered 
scope of business of one of the parties). Formalistic approaches to enforcement that focus on capacity 
also reinforce doctrinal requiremants that obligations not conflict with state policies. See Economic 
Contract Law of the PRC, arts. 4 & 7; General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC, supra note 35, arts. 
55 & 58. Public notice requirements on property transfers, for example, are intended primarily to meet the 
needs of economic stability and security and remain subject to the controls imposed by state registries. See 
Sun Xianzhong, Lun Bu Dongchan Wuquan Dengji [On the Registration of Property Rights in 
Immovables], ZHONGGUO FAXUE [CHINESE JURISPRUDENCE], no. 5, 51 (1996); Wang Shiwei & Wang 
Penglin, Dui Woguo Caichan Shenbao Fa de Gouxiang [Thoughts on our Property Registration Law], 
FALU KEXUE [LEGAL SCIENCE], no. 91 (1998). 
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economic regulation. Administrative bureaucracies in the PRC have long 
dominated the regulatory process, remaining generally impervious to external 
restraint. The most recent decade of legal reform saw efforts to curtail the 
power of bureaucratic agencies through administrative law. Foreign practices 
in administrative law have informed discussion in China on such matters as 
resolution of administrative disputes, enforcement of administrative orders, 
and judicial review.78 The Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) was heavily 
influenced by the U.S. Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a 
somewhat ironic situation in light of the contradictions between China’s civil 
law governance system and the separation of powers principles that inform 
the APA. As well, American academics lectured at Chinese law schools on 
administrative law, imparting broad norms that could be adapted to China’s 
conditions.79 Administrative law systems in Germany and Japan were also 
referenced in the course of drafting the ALL.80  
1. Administrative Law and Expanding Norms of Accountability 
The ALL formalized the authority of the People’s Courts to review 
administrative agency decisions.81 Article 5 of the ALL authorizes the 
People’s Courts to determine whether a challenged administrative decision is 
lawful and in accord with relevant laws and regulations. Under Article 54 of 
the ALL, the People’s Courts have power to quash illegal administrative 
orders; to compel administrative action, and to revise unfair administrative 
sanctions. Administrative cases are heard before specialized Administrative 
Adjudication Chambers (Xingzheng Shenpan Ting) established within the 
 
 
 78. See Hu Jianlin, Guo Wai Xingzheng Sifa Tizhi [Foreign Systems for Administrative 
Adjudication], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 2, 88 (1989); Jiang Bixin, Guo Wai Xingzheng 
Susong Zhong de Sifa Biangengquan [The Juridicial Authority of Revision in Foreign Administrative 
Litigation], FAXUE RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], June 24, 1989, at 4. 
 79. See, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Fashioning an Administrative Law System, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 
415 (1988). 
 80. See, e.g., Liu Zhaoxing, Lianbang Deguo de Xingzheng Susong Fa Ji Xingzheng Susong 
Zhidu [The Administrative Litigation Law and Administrative Litigation System of the Federal 
Republic of Germany], FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW], no. 1, 87 (1988); Liu Hai, Riben Guojia 
Xingzheng Jiguan de Jiben Tedian [The Basic Features of National Administrative Organs in Japan], 
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], June 24, 1989, at 4; Zhang Ling, Riben Xingzheng Susong Fa 
Zhong de Kanggao Susong [Litigation over Refusal of Complaint in Japan’s Administrative Litigation 
Law], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], June 24, 1989, at 4. 
 81. See Pitman B. Potter, The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC, 24 L. & GOV’T 22 (1991) 
(English translation of Administrative Litigation Law) [hereinafter Administration Litigation Law]; Pitman 
B. Potter, Judicial Review and Bureaucratic Reform: The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC, in 
DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 270 (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1994). See also J. Fa & S. 
Leng, Judicial Review of Administration in the People’s Republic of China, 1 OCCASIONAL 
PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES (1992). 
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People’s Courts.82 By the date the law went into effect, some 2,600 tribunals 
under the provincial and local courts, staffed by 8,000 judges, had been 
established to handle ALL cases.83 
The basic tenet of the ALL supports judicial supervision over 
administrative action, as the courts are empowered to quash illegal 
administrative decisions and to revise administrative penalties which are 
obviously unfair. The ALL supports expanded judicial review through 
provisions on the scope of cases accepted, the types of parties that may bring 
suit or that may be compelled to appear as defendants, trial procedures and 
enforcement provisions, and provisions for tort damage remedies. Under 
Article 11 of the ALL, the People’s Courts have authority to hear suits 
brought by citizens and juridical persons84 (including foreign businesses)85 
regarding challenges to administrative decisions imposing punishments and 
fines, restricting or infringing on property rights, intervening in business 
operations, denying licenses, and a number of other matters. The broad scope 
of administrative conduct subject to review under the ALL is intended to 
curb bureaucratism and prevent abuses of power by administrative officials 
who impose their will without reference to or support from regulatory rules.86 
This has significance not only to encourage administrative regularity, but 
also as an anti-corruption measure, discouraging officials from enforcing 
regulations, based on favoritism and patronage.  
2. Limits to Adaptation of Norms of Accountability 
Despite its provisions supporting judicial review of administrative 
conduct, the ALL also suggests the limits to norms of accountability of 
bureaucratic agencies. For example, under Article 5 of the ALL, courts 
hearing ALL cases are authorized to review only the legality and not the 
propriety of administrative decisions.87 The ALL also places significant 
 
 
 82. Zui Gao Renmin Fayuan Xingzheng Shenpan Ting Zhengshi Jianli Bing Kaizhan Gongzuo 
[Administrative Adjudication Chamber of the Supreme People’s Court is Formally Established and Begins 
Work], 4 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZUI GAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO [PRC SUPREME COURT 
BULLETIN] 10 (1988). 
 83. Chang Hong, 1 Oct Law Will Permit Citizens to Sue Officials, CHINA DAILY, Sept. 28, 1990, at 1, 
reprinted in FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA, Sept. 28, 1990, at 11. 
 84. Juridical persons may include economic enterprises and business units, state organs, social groups 
or other legal organizations. See General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC, supra note 35, ch. 3. 
 85. See generally PETER H. CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
LEGAL SYSTEM (1997). 
 86. E.g., Wang Yuming, Xingzheng Susong Fa Shixing de Jiji Zhengzhi Xiaoyong [The Positive 
Political Utility of Implementing the Administrative Litigation Act], FA ZHI JIANSHE [BUILDING THE LEGAL 
SYSTEM], no. 4, 2 (1990). 
 87. The courts are to defer review of the propriety of administrative decisions pending future 
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limits on the range of decisions that the People’s Courts are authorized to 
review. Judicial review does not extend, for example, to the inherent validity 
of administrative laws and regulations.88 This provision suggests that the 
political system retains ultimate authority to determine the validity of laws 
and regulations. The reluctance to permit the courts to substitute themselves 
for the legislative organs of government was at the root of this restriction.89 
At issue was the matter of legislative authority, and the view that the power 
to determine the essential validity of laws should remain solely with the NPC 
legislature or the delegated administrative departments of the State Council.90 
The contradiction was recognized that the courts could not adjudicate 
administrative cases effectively without ruling on the validity of underlying 
administrative regulations.91 Nonetheless, the courts were barred from 
making such judgments. As a result, a decision by an administrative agency 
can be overturned by a court only if the decision is in violation of the 
agency’s own rules, while the legality and interpretation of these rules remain 
the province of the agency, not the court. In response, the point has been 
forcefully made that the State Council should enact special rules permitting 
judicial interpretation of administrative laws and regulations.92 
The ALL also limits the authority of the courts to substitute their own 
judgment for that of the administrative agency.93 Although arguments were 
raised in favor of limited powers of the courts to amend administrative 
decisions,94 resistance by administrative organs was sufficiently strong to 
 
 
refinements of China’s administrative law system. See e.g., Wang Hanbin, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Xingzheng Susong Fa (Caoan) de Shuoming [Explanation of the Draft Administrative Litigation Law of the 
PRC], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Apr. 10, 1989, at 2. 
 88. Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 81, art. 2(ii). 
 89. WANG MINCAN, XINGZHENG FA GAIYAO [INTRODUCTORY OUTLINE TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] 
221 (1983). 
 90. Zhang Shuyi, Xingzheng Susong Fa (Caoan) Ruogan Zhenglun Wenti Sikao [Inquiry Into Various 
Controversial Issues of the (Draft) Administrative Litigation Law], FAXUE [JURISPRUDENCE], no. 3, 8 
(1989). 
 91. Zhang Shuyi, Xingzheng Fagui Jieshou Si Fa Shencha Xi [Analysis of Administrative Laws and 
Regulations Accepting Judicial Scrutiny], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Mar. 24, 1989, at 3. See 
also Guanyu Difang Renmin Zhengfu Guiding Ke Xiang Renmin Fayuan Qisu de Xingzheng Anjian Fayuan 
Ying Fou Shouli Wenti de Pi Fu [Response to a Question as to Whether Courts Should Accept 
Administrative Cases of Local Government Regulations Submitted to the People’s Courts for Litigation] 
(1987). 
 92. See Wang Xuezheng, Zai Xingzheng Susong Zhong de Keneng Yudao de Wenti [Questions That 
May Be Encountered in Administrative Litigation], FAXUE ZAZHI [LEGAL STUDIES MAGAZINE], no. 3, 24 
(1990). 
 93. See, e.g., Xingzheng Susong Fa Caoan Zuotan Hui Jieshu [Conference on the Administrative 
Litigation Law Closes], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY] Dec. 20, 1988, at 4; Dui Xingzheng Susong Fa 
Caoan Ji Ge Wenti de Jianjie [Opinions on Several Questions of the Draft Administrative Litigation Law], 
FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL SYSTEM DAILY], Feb. 3, 1989, at 2. 
 94. See, e.g., Jiang Bixin, Lun Xingzheng Susong Zhong de Sifa Bian Geng Quan [Discussion of the 
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prevent inclusion of such powers in the ALL. The final text permitted 
judicial amendment of administrative decisions only in cases of 
administrative penalties that are deemed manifestly unfair.95 Generally, 
however, courts were not to be substitutes for the administrative organs 
themselves, and thus were limited in their authority to revise administrative 
decisions.96  
Notwithstanding suggestions that the courts will be granted broader 
review authority as the system is perfected,97 the limits on the scope of the 
judicial review continued to undermine the capacity of courts to exercise 
external supervision over administrative action. Ten years of practice under 
the ALL suggest that protection against administrative abuses through 
effective judicial review remains an elusive goal.98 In part this is due to the 
intent and limited reach of the statute.99 As well, popular confidence in the 
law’s effectiveness is limited. A study published in 1998 suggested that less 
than twenty percent of potential claimants would be willing to file actions 
under the ALL.100  
The judicial review provisions of the ALL were augmented by those of 
the State Compensation Law (SCL), which permitted awards of 
compensation to individuals and organizations harmed physically or 
financially by unlawful bureaucratic action.101 However, like the ALL, the 
SCL remains relatively weak as a basis for challenging misdeeds by high 
 
 
Authority of Judicial Revision in the Course of Administrative Litigation], FAXUE YANJIU [LEGAL 
STUDIES], no. 6, 31 (1988). Jiang’s position with the Supreme People’s Court at the time this article was 
published suggests the article was an effort to win support for the authority of the courts to amend generally 
administrative decisions.  
 95. Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 81, art. 54(iv). 
 96. See, e.g., Wang Hanbin, supra note 87. 
 97. Id.  
 98. For compendia of case decisions involving the Administrative Litigation Law, See, e.g., 
RENMIN FAYUAN YINAN PANLI PINGXI: XINGZHENG JUAN [ANALYSIS OF DIFFICULT JUDGMENTS OF 
THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: ADMINISTRATIVE VOLUME] (Wang Guichen et al. eds., 1999); XINGZHENG 
SUSONG YU TUDI GUANLI FA [ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION AND THE LAND ADMINISTRATION LAW] 
(Administrative Adjudication Chamber of the Supreme People’s Court ed., 1999); CHANGJIAN ANJIAN 
GUIFANHUA SHENLI ZHINAN [GUIDE TO THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMONLY SEEN CASES] (Liang 
Huaren & Zhang Jiyang eds., 1992). Administrative law cases also appear in quarterly published the 
series, RENMIN FAYUAN ANLI XUAN [COMPILATION OF CASES FROM THE PEOPLE’S COURTS] 
(Supreme People’s Court ed). 
 99. See Ranier Heufers et al., The Impact of the Administrative Procedure [sic] Law on Legal 
Security in the People’s Republic of China, in OCCASIONAL PAPER POLICY ANALYSIS, (Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation eds., 1996). See also generally Pitman B. Potter, Administrative Litigation and 
Political Rights in China, 3 HUM. RTS. TRIB., no. 2, 4 (1992). 
 100. See JIANG MINGAN, ZHONGGUO XINGZHENG FAZHI FAZHAN JINGCHENG DIAOCHA BAOGAO 
[REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS OF CHINA’S ADMINISTRATIVE 
RULE OF LAW] 324 (1998). 
 101. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Peichangfa [State Compensation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (1994). 
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officials. The statute excludes the possibility of compensation for harm by 
officials acting outside the scope of their duties, where the complainant has 
caused harm through its own acts, or “under other circumstances prescribed 
by law.” The law also requires that aggrieved parties first file their claims 
directly with the administrative agency charged with wrongdoing, an 
exhaustion of remedies requirement that may deter potential claimants. The 
empirical record suggests considerable weakness in implementation of 
administrative rules on compensation. A study published in 1998 indicated 
that of the 1646 cases filed with the Beijing People’s Courts at all levels 
during 1990-96, only seven resulted in compensation to the complainant.102 
In 1999, the People’s Courts throughout the country handled only 6,788 
cases involving claims for state and administrative compensation.103  
Efforts to restrain bureaucratic power have extended as well to 
administrative rulemaking, although the impetus once again turns on 
compliance with higher level directives rather than accountability to the 
subjects of rule. Measures to rein in the rulemaking powers of the 
bureaucracy were attempted during the first decade of legal reform, 
exemplified by the Provisional Regulations on the Procedure for Enacting 
Administrative Laws and Regulations,104 which purported to establish limits 
on the rulemaking authority of administrative offices and departments based 
on their relative rank in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Supervision of the 
rulemaking practices of bureaucratic agencies was confined to the authority 
of superior level departments, however. This process was formalized in the 
Administrative Supervision Law (ASL) of 1997, which authorized superior 
level agencies to require subordinate units to amend or annul their 
regulations where inconsistent with superior laws and regulations.105 
However, due to its limits on the rights of affected parties to bring legal 
action against errant officials, the statute offers little support for the subjects 
of administrative action to challenge bureaucratic rulemaking. The statute 
does permit higher level administrative organs to monitor activities by lower 
level officials, to ensure compliance with valid laws and regulations, and to 
 
 
 102. See Jiang, supra note 100. 
 103. See Report on Just Implementation of Law by PRC’s People’s Courts in 1999, BEIJING 
XINHUA DOMESTIC SERV., Mar. 11, 2000, in FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA (FBIS-CHI-2000-0311) (Mar. 
30, 2000), at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi?IOI=FBIS_clear&docname=0fs8l1a01hq8dh 
&CID=C518371582031250236625998. 
 104. See Xingzheng Fagui Zhiding Chengxu Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Regulations on the 
Procedures for Enacting Administrative Laws and Regulations] (1987). 
 105. See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Xingzheng Jianchu Fa [Administrative Supervision Law 
of the People’s Republic of China] (May 9, 1997).  
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curb corruption.106 Ongoing efforts to draft a law on administrative procedure 
may help strengthen this process, although it remains uncertain whether these 
will extend to judicial review of decisions and behavior by Party organs.107 
While foreign influences have been evident in China’s administrative law 
reforms, they remain limited. The administrative law system in China is 
intended primarily to ensure that subordinate institutions comply with 
directives from their superiors. This extends to the issue of corruption, where 
administrative law measures have been particularly evident.108 However, 
foreign influences have had little effect on the basic normative premise 
underlying China’s administrative law system, namely that administrative 
law remains an instrument in service of Party-led governance. The unhappy 
experiences of dissidents such as Guo Luoji to utilize administrative law to 
challenge party domination, underscore the limitations of foreign liberal 
principles on government accountability.109 While the SCL promises 
remedies for harm caused by venal officials acting outside their mandate, 
even this measure does not permit challenges to Party dominance per se. On 
the other hand, administrative law has provided remedies against improper 
behavior of regulators in areas such as land regulation, where there is less 
direct political challenge to the Party’s dominance.110 
Administrative law reform in China reflects a dynamic of selective 
adaptation with associated elements of perception, complementarity, and 
legitimacy. Elements of perception are reflected in policy imperatives aimed 
at bureaucratic reform and at the use of administrative rules to control the 
behavior of lower level officials and possibly to reduce corruption. This may 
in fact be a misperception, for the effectiveness of formal law in controlling 
bureaucratic behavior remains uncertain. As well, misperception is evident in 
 
 
 106. See Ma Huaide, Xingzheng Jiandu Yu Jiuji Zhidu de Xin Tupo [A New Breakthrough in the 
Administrative Supervision and Remedy System], ZHENGFA LUNTAN [POLITICS AND LAW FORUM], no. 
4, 66 (1990). See also LIN ZHE, QUANLI FABAI YU QUANLI ZHIYUE [CORRUPTION OF AUTHORITY 
AND LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORITY] (1997). 
 107. See YANG HAIKUN & HUANG XUEXIAN, ZHONGGUO XINGZHENG CHENGXU FADIANHUA: 
CONG BIJIAO JIAODU YANJIU [CODIFICATION OF CHINESE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: STUDIED 
FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE] (1999). 
 108. See, e.g., Guojia Xingzheng Jiguan Gongzuo Renyuan Tanwu Huilu Xingzheng Chufen 
Zanxing Guiding [Provisional Regulations on Handling Corruption by State Administrative Institution 
Officials]; Guojia Xingzheng Jiguan Gongzuo Renyuan Tanwu Huilu Xingzheng Chufen Zanxing 
Guiding Shishi Xize [Implementing Regulations for the Provisional Regulations on Handling 
Corruption by State Administrative Institution Officials] (1989). 
 109. See Guo Luoji Kangsu Li Tieying [Guo Luoji Rebuts Li Tienying], ZHONGGUO ZHI CHUN 
[CHINA SPRING], Mar. 1992, at 9; Guo Luoji de Shangsu Zhuang [Guo Luoji’s Appeal], ZHONGGUO 
ZHI CHUN [CHINA SPRING], May 1992, at 44. 
 110. See, e.g., XINGZHENG SUSONG YU TUDI GUANLIFA: XIN JIE [ADMINISTRATIVE LITIGATION 
OF LAND ADMINISTRATION LAW: NEW INTERPRETATIONS] (Supreme People’s Court Administrative 
Tribunal ed., 1999). 
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assumptions about the utility of foreign law models, particularly the use 
models based on common law principles in China’s civil law-based 
administrative system. This raises the prospect of a hybridized system of 
administrative law as judicial review principles associated with the U.S. 
system of separation of powers are inserted to China’s continental legal 
arrangement with its quite different operational principles.  
These issues of perception affect the element of complementarity. Efforts 
at achieving complementarity are clearly evident in policies aimed at 
restraining bureaucratic behavior through the vehicle of judicial review and 
external supervision. However, ongoing barriers to completion of an 
administrative procedure code, as well as varying degrees of effectiveness in 
promoting use of judicial review under the ALL, suggest that imported 
norms of judicial review are not yet seen as fully effective in controlling 
bureaucratic excess.  
Selective adaptation of foreign principles on judicial review also reflects 
elements of legitimacy. Regime legitimacy is clearly at issue in the effort to 
control lower level officials and reduce corruption. Whether the legitimacy of 
the effort to borrow foreign norms will spill over to lend legitimacy to the 
resulting regulatory regime is less certain. Officials within the bureaucratic 
system, whose support is critical, have yet to evidence strong support for the 
new system, raising the prospect of a conflicted legitimacy whereby popular 
support is contradicted by official ambivalence. China’s administrative law 
reform project, while reflecting the dynamic of selective adaptation also 
reveals potential problems faced when important elements of perception, 
complementarity, and legitimacy are conflicted. 
C. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance entails norms and procedures for management and 
accountability of economic actors. These operate against a backdrop of 
property norms that determine the nature of the rights and interests held by 
corporations and their shareholders, and administrative norms that affect the 
process of government regulation. Thus, property and administrative law 
reforms set the parameters of possibility for corporate governance reforms. 
Corporate governance in China proceeds primarily from the principles set 
forth in China’s Company Law, in combination with provisions of related 
laws and regulations such as the Securities Law of the PRC.111 Reflecting the 
 
 
 111. See Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, reprinted in CHINA ECON. NEWS (Supp. 
no. 2), Mar. 2, 1994, at 1. The statute was revised in 1999 to impose stricter information disclosure 
requirements and to clarify issues on management rights in state-owned enterprises. The revised statute 
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intersection of global and local norms, the Company Law formalizes the 
rules and procedures for company operations.112 China’s corporate 
governance regimes have been influenced by a variety of foreign 
jurisdictions. In company law, the English and German models were 
particularly influential and in securities regulation, the U.S. system served as 
a core influence.113 China’s Company Law provisions on joint stock 
companies and limited liability companies reflect the distinction found in 
Anglo-American law between limited companies and public limited 
companies.114 Echoes of German law models on private limited companies 
(GmbH) and public limited companies (AG) are also evident.115  
The Company Law’s provisions on securities issues (complementing 
those in the Security Law of the PRC) also reflect foreign influences. 
Chinese experts leading the securities regulatory system received much of 
their legal education in the United States and continue to look to the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) system as models for market regulatory regimes.116 The State Council 
also consulted Japanese securities regulatory models in the course of its 
rulemaking and legislation on securities regulation.117 Taiwan company laws 
 
 
appears in CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS (CCH) § 13-518 (Austrialia Ltd. ed., 1999). Citations 
herein are to the revised statute. References to the Securities Law of the PRC (1998) are to CHINA ECON. 
NEWS (Supp. no. 3), Mar. 15, 1999, at 1. 
 112. A number of preliminary analyses have emerged addressing this legislation, including Preston 
Torbert, Broadening the Scope of Investment, CHINA BUS. REV., May-June 1994, at 48 and David Ho, 
China’s New Company Law: Something Concrete to Go By, in E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Feb. 1994, at 9. 
 113. See, e.g., Mark Gillen & Pitman Potter, The Convergence of Securities Laws in Asia: Case 
Studies of Malaysia, Singapore, Japan and China, in ASIA-PACIFIC COMPARATIVE LAW (Gerald 
Fergerson ed., 1998); Mei Shengshi, Wo Guo Zhengzhuan Li Fa de Que He Luan Ji Qi Zhili [The 
Deficiencies and Disorder in Our Securities Legislation and Their Resolution],” ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN 
BAO [CHINESE SECURITIES REPORT], Jan. 25, 1994, at 7; Peng Zhenming, Touze Jijin Lifa Ruogan Wenti 
Sikao [Consideration of Several Questions on Investment Funds Legislation], ZHENGZHI YU FALU 
[POLITICS AND LAW] no. 1, 8 (1996). 
 114. See, e.g., Robert Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, YALE J. INT’L L. 273 (1995).  
 115. For discussion of German Company Law, see NORBERT HORN ET AL., GERMAN PRIVATE 
AND COMMERCIAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 251 (Tony Weir tr. 1982); NIGEL FOSTER, GERMAN LAW 
AND LEGAL SYSTEM 289 (1993); HOWARD FISHER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LEGAL LANGUAGE 
81 (1996).  
 116. Gao Xiqing, former general counsel for the Chinese Administration for Securities Exchanges 
attended Duke University and Gao Peiji, former general counsel for the Shenzhen Securities Exchange was 
trained at Berkeley. Other influential Chinese officials received U.S. training under the auspices of the 
Committee on Legal Education Exchanges With China, and U.S. and Canadian law schools continue to 
benefit from the contributions of law students and scholars from China writing on securities law. See, e.g., 
J.Z. Zhang, Comment, Securities Markets and Securities Regulation in China, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG. 558 (1997). 
 117. See, e.g., ZHONG WAI GUFEN ZHI FAGUI HUIBIAN [COMPILATION OF CHINESE AND FOREIGN 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE STOCK SYSTEM] (Policy and Law Office of the State Council’s State 
Owned Enterprise Admininstration ed., 1992). 
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and practice also exerted significant influence.118 Reflecting these influences, 
the Company Law requires periodic reporting by listed companies on 
financial position and operational situation, complementing the Securities 
Law’s continuing disclosure provisions requiring that “important events” 
(ranging from operational and organizational issues to financial questions) be 
published as well as reported to regulators.119  
Based on a draft that had been submitted in March 1993, after undergoing 
years of refinement and debate,120 and on various “opinions” on stock 
companies and limited liablity companies,121 the Company Law went into 
effect July 1, 1994. Revised in 1999, the statute runs to 230 articles covering 
the establishment and organization of companies, bond issues, accounting 
matters, mergers, bankruptcy and liquidation, responsibilities of branches of 
foreign companies, and other matters. The Company Law imposes duties and 
process requirements on company operations, through regulation of boards of 
directors and company managers. Article 46 makes the board of directors of 
limited liability companies answerable to shareholders, a provision matched 
in Article 112 for companies limited by shares, Article 59 prohibits directors 
and managers of limited liability companies from engaging in corrupt 
activities, and Article 61 prohibits directors and managers from committing 
conflicts of interest. Parallel provisions are imposed in Articles 123 on 
directors and managers of companies limited by shares. Thus, the law 
provides a tentative framework for fiduciary relations within the corporation, 
albeit subject to Party interpretations of public interest.122 Article 17 of the 
Company Law limits Party intrusion only to the requirements of the Party’s 
own Charter, which in turn may subject company decisions and behavior to 
political and policy imperatives.  
The Company Law empowers shareholders as owners of companies to 
exercise control over management and operations. The shareholders board of 
limited liability companies is comprised of all shareholders and is described 
 
 
 118. See, e.g., GUDONG ZHAIQUAN QUANSHU [ENCYCLOPEDIA OF STOCKS AND BONDS] (Jin 
Jiandong et al. eds., 1992). 
 119. Company Law of the PRC, supra note 71, arts. 156 & 175, Securities Law of the PRC, art. 
62. Compare with discussion of U.S. securities law models in Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal 
Securities Law Concerning Non-Public Information, 73 GEO. L.J., 1115, and D.L. JOHNSTON, CANADIAN 
SECURITIES REGULATION 1-36 (1977). 
 120. See Draft Corporate Law Submitted, FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA, Feb. 16, 1993, at 29; Speech by 
Qiao Shi at Closing of NPC, FBIS DAILY REP.: CHINA, Apr. 1, 1993, at 22. One source from which many 
of the Company Law’s provision were drawn is the Provisional Regulations of Shenzhen Municipality on 
Companies Limited by Shares (Mar. 17, 1992), reprinted in CHINA L. & PRAC., May 7, 1992, at 12. 
 121. See, e.g., Gufen You Xian Gongsi Guifan Yijian [Opinion on Standards For Limited Liability 
Stock Companies], in RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE’S DAILY], June 19, 1992. 
 122. See Michael Irl Nikkel, “Chinese Characteristics” in Corporate Clothing: Questions of 
Fiduciary Duty in China’s Company Law, 80 MINN. L. REV. 503, 526 (1995). 
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as the company’s most powerful authority.123 The board is empowered to 
determine business policy and investment plans; to appoint and replace 
directors and supervisors; and to examine and approve operations, financial 
plans, and reporting.124 In companies limited by shares, the shareholders 
meeting is the most powerful authority.125 The shareholders meeting is 
authorized to determine business policies and plans; appoint and replace 
directors and supervisors; and to examine and approve operations, financial 
plans, and reporting.126 While directors and managers of companies limited 
by shares have significant operational authority and discretion, they are 
ultimately responsible to the shareholders meeting.127 Consistent with 
principles of company law in North America and Europe, China’s company 
law provisions on shareholders reflect a basic property rights principle 
linking ownership and operational control.128  
Influenced by German law models, the Company Law also provides for a 
supervisory committee, whose role is to oversee the Board of Directors and 
ensure it serves the interests of shareholders.129 Article 52 requires a 
supervisory committee for limited liability companies, whose scope of 
business is relatively large, and requires one to two supervisors for smaller 
companies. Article 124 requires companies limited by shares to have a 
supervisory committee. Revisions to the Company Law enacted in 1999, 
extended the supervisory committee provisions to wholly state-owned 
companies, whereas previously these committees were limited to limited 
liability and share-holding companies.130 Through these measures, the 
Company Law attempts to strengthen accountability of company 
management, shareholder interests, and also the public interest. While 
corruption has weakened the effect of these measures in practice, they 
nonetheless represent both a recognition of the need for, and a mechanism for 
carrying out, corporate governance norms imported from international 
practice.  
Principles centered on private corporate property rights remain subject to 
 
 
 123. Company Law of the PRC, supra note 71, art. 37. 
 124. Id. art. 38. 
 125. Id. art 102. 
 126. Id. art. 103. 
 127. Id. art. 112. 
 128. Id. art. 4. 
 129. Art & Gu, supra note 114. 
 130. Extending the protections of the Company Law to state-owned companies had been seen as 
inviting abuse by government agencies with both regulatory responsibility and financial interests in 
companies. Chuan Roger Peng, Limited Liability in China: A Partial Reading of China’s Company 
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general requirements of compliance with law and regulation, which express 
imperatives of social and state interest, with promotion of public welfare.131 
A significant element of this relates to information disclosure. The Company 
Law emphasizes information disclosure for both companies and transactions, 
although the primary recipients appear to be regulators rather than investors. 
Article 22 of the Company Law requires that the Articles of Association for 
limited liability companies, submitted to the regulatory authorities as a 
condition for licensing, contain information on scope of business, capital, 
names of shareholders, capital contributions, organization and management 
procedures, and other matters. Article 27 permits regulatory authorities to 
investigate registration documentation prior to licensing. Parallel provisions 
are set out in Article 79 and Articles 84-86 for companies limited by shares. 
In the area of securities issues, the Company Law contains further 
provisions on information disclosure, requiring prospectus documentation for 
companies limited by shares to include information on: (i) the number of 
shares subscribed to be promoters; (ii) the par value and issue price of each 
share; (iii) the total number of non-registered shares issued; (iv) the rights 
and obligations of subscribers; and (v) the time limit for the public offer and 
the notification that subscibers may revoke their subscription if the offer is 
under-subscribed.132 A new prospectus must be provided for each new share 
issuance.133 Applications submitted to the State Council’s securities 
administration department for approval of share offers must include 
additional information on the company’s operating budget and other financial 
information.134 Listed companies are required to make public their financial 
and operational conditions and to publish financial statements every six 
months of the fiscal year.135 Violations of the information disclosure 
provisions (including false or fraudulent reporting) are dealt with by fines 
and a right of private compensation.136 
The disclosure requirements are augmented by the Company Law’s 
provisions on accounting. The Company Law requires that yearly financial 
reporting include balance sheets, profit and loss statements, reports on 
financial conditions, and profit distribution statements.137 These reports must 
also comply with the Accounting Law of the PRC, which was in part revised 
 
 
 131. Company Law of the PRC, supra note 71, art. 14. 
 132. Id. art. 87. See also Administration of Offerings of New Shares by Listed Companies Procedures 
(Mar. 28, 2001) CHINA L. & PRAC., May 2001, at 24. 
 133. Company Law of the PRC, supra note 71, art. 140. 
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in late 1993 to encompass the new forms of business organization brought on 
by the Company Law.138 The Company Law sets forth a general principle 
that issues of shares must be public, fair, and impartial,139 and imposes fines 
for improper share issues.140 In addition to the Company Law’s general 
provisions for sanctions against improper issues of stock, the law also 
provides penalties for potentially manipulative activities such as false 
reporting, failing to complete delivery of a sold stock, and other 
improprieties.141 
The Company Law’s provisions on corporate governance embody 
changing principles of property and administrative law. Property rights 
concepts are embedded in corporate governance provisions on the rights of 
shareholders to obtain information about corporate finances and operations. 
In addition, the authority of shareholders to appoint and supervise 
management is grounded in notions linking ownership and management 
rights in property. As with the Chinese property rights discourse generally, 
the private rights of shareholders are qualified by provisions on protection of 
public welfare. Corporate governance provisions also reflect changing norms 
of administrative law, such that the supervisory authority of company and 
securities regulators remains subject to the provisions of the Administrative 
Litigation Law and other measures on judicial review. However, reflecting 
limits in the Administrative Litigation Law and related measures, company 
supervision is exercised by state regulators largely immune to external 
scrutiny. The reporting requirements and compliance rules of the 
bureaucratic supervisory system play a more central role than the prospects 
for private action through either judicial or administrative process. Indeed, 
recurring efforts to expand the capacity for private litigation on corporate and 
securities matters continue to face strong resistance.142 
Complementing provisions of the Company Law and Securities Law, 
additional standards for corporate governance of market listed companies 
were issues in January 2002 by the Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission and the State Economic and Trade Commission.143 These 
 
 
 138. See Accounting Law of the PRC (1985, as amended 1993), in CHINA ECON. NEWS, Jan. 24, 1994, 
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 139. Company Law of the PRC, supra note 71, art. 130. 
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 142. See Wenhai Cai, Private Securities Litigation in China: Of Prominence and Problems, 13 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 135 (1999); See also Supreme People’s Court Notice on Civil Securities Fraud 
Cases (Jan. 15, 2002).  
 143. Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi Zhili Zhunze [Standards For Corporate Governance in Market 
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provisions reiterate general norms of fairness and openness in the issuance of 
securities, and underscore the authority of the Shareholders Meeting in 
overseeing company management decisions on issuance of shares.144 The 
Shareholders Meeting also has general authority and responsibility to 
participate in corporate governance.145 The new measures support the right of 
shareholders to seek compensation and possibly to file suit in cases of 
unlawful conduct by the Shareholders Meeting or the Board of Directors.146 
The standards also provide mechanisms for strengthening the oversight role 
of the Board of Directors, such as specialised directors’ committees, 
procedures for directors meetings, and an increased role for independent 
directors.147 The Standards provide additional detail for provisions on the 
Supervisory Committee, specifying its duties and authority over such matters 
as accounting, asset management and legal compliance.148 Finally the new 
measures expressed renewed commitment to information disclosure by 
listing companies.149 In each of these sections, the Standards expand upon 
provisions of the Company Law and the Securities Law, drawing yet again 
on international models of corporate governance. 
Provisions of Chinese law on corporate governance reveal the effects of 
selective adaptation. Imported norms from private property are reflected in 
Company Law provisions on shareholding and ownership of corporations. 
However, these are mediated by policy imperatives relating to local public 
welfare, such that company behavior remains dependent on state approval 
and supervision. And while Company Law provisions on information 
disclosure reflect the increased influence of globalized norms of 
transparency, selective adaptation to local concerns is also evident as the 
beneficiaries of transparency are more often state regulatory agencies than 
private market actors. 
Selective adaptation at work in China’s efforts at corporate governance 
reform reveals elements of perception, complementarity, and legitimacy. 
Conscious borrowing of foreign models drawn from North America and 
Europe reflect perceptions about the inadequacy of China’s regulatory norms 
for the state-owned sector, as well as assumptions about the relationship 
between corporate law regimes and economic growth. In the area of 
complementarity, a key question is the ability to harmonize regulatory 
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principles of private interest and efficiency with norms of public goods and 
state-centred economic policies. However, in view of the relatively 
undeveloped state of company law in China prior to the current efforts at 
reform, the element of complementarity rests essentially between foreign law 
models and domestic policy principles. The flexibility of the latter will be an 
important component of long term complementarity in the regulatory order 
for corporate governance. Legitimacy is also a factor, as support from local 
business and bureaucratic sectors, as well as the general populace remains 
essential to the success of corporate governance reform. Generally, wide 
support for efforts to regularize corporate governance has the potential to 
build legitimacy for both the process of selectively adapting foreign models 
and for the regulatory norms that ensue.  
IV. SUMMARY 
Regulatory reform in China is a major element of China’s expanded 
participation in the international political economy. Following accession to 
the WTO, China’s systems for economic regulation confront conflicting 
imperatives of compliance with WTO norms and preservation of local 
interests. On the one hand, China’s formal international obligations mandate 
compliance generally with the norms and expectations of the international 
market system. This means, in part, support for private property rights, 
effective judicial review of administrative action, and relative autonomy in 
corporate governance. Yet the ongoing process of legal and economic reform 
in China also requires attention to local interests in social welfare and 
development. Property law in China has begun to support norms of private 
ownership, although the system stops significantly short of the liberal ideals 
of private property associated with globalization. China’s administrative law 
regime reflects an effort to make administrative units more accountable and 
subject to a modicum of judicial supervision. However, there are significant 
limits to the review powers granted the courts. Regimes for corporate 
governance also reveal influences of the international system, but also reflect 
limits derived from local legal culture and policy contexts.  
The dynamic of selective adaptation has played a central role in the 
processes and outcomes by which China pursues reforms in the areas of 
property law, administrative law and corporate governance. Elements of 
perception, complementarity, and legitimacy are evident in each of these 
sectors. As these elements develop and advance the process of selective 
adaptation, the tensions between patrimonial sovereignty and responsible 
agency as norms of governance may gradually erode. The very exercise of 
selective adaptation reflects a willingness to diminish sovereignty in favor of 
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accountability. While issues of perception and complementarity remain 
contingent to a significant degree on commitments to norms of patrimonial 
sovereignty, the element of legitimacy remains a critical factor. To the extent 
that legitimacy in the process and outcome of selective adaptation remains 
important, the audience from which legitimacy is sought has expanded 
opportunities to demand accountability. This process will likely continue to 
affect the contours for economic regulation in China, and the extent to which 
these match expectations about compliance with WTO and other norms of 
globalization. 
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